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ABSTRACT
Platform Development and Path Following Controller Design for Full-Sized Vehicle
Automation
by
Austin D. Costley, Master of Science
Utah State University, 2017
Major Professor: Rajnikant Sharma, Ph.D.
Department: Electrical and Computer Engineering
The purpose of this thesis is to explore the challenges of reverse engineering the communication protocols of a stock 2013 Ford Focus EV, and build an open-source automation
platform to control the vehicle. The automated platform could be used to research modern
vehicle systems security, control system design and implementation, and automated systems design. This thesis will discuss the development of the automation platform and the
components used in the final design.
During the reverse engineering stages of this work, important security concerns were
identified in the Controller Area Network (CAN) architecture of the vehicle. The architecture allowed for arbitrary vehicle acceleration to be commanded through CAN message
injection. It was shown that the acceleration message could be sent from a tap point on the
CAN bus, or through the diagnostics (OBD-II) port. The vehicle would accept the injected
message, and the vehicle would accelerate without error. Another approach explored in this
work is to control the vehicle by emulating the output of the accelerator pedal, brake pedal,
and steering torque sensors. The latter approach was ultimately used to control the vehicle.
The controller design for the autonomous system was a successive loop closure method
where the low-level controllers would control vehicle speed and steering wheel angle, and the
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high-level controller would follow a path and provide commands for the low-level controllers.
Before controllers were designed, a model identification approach was used to obtain transfer
functions between the input signals and the vehicle.
A major barrier for researchers to perform automated vehicle research is the cost.
There are a variety of hardware and software systems available to aid in the development of
automation process, but they are often very expensive. This work is provided as an opensource solution for the software and hardware design. The component selection process for
this project was heavily influenced by the cost of the component and the accessibility of
open-source software to interface with the component. The overall cost of the automation
platform was under $2,500, and the software has been made available to the public.
(70 pages)
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PUBLIC ABSTRACT
Platform Development and Path Following Controller Design for Full-Sized Vehicle
Automation
Austin D. Costley
The purpose of this thesis is to discuss the design and development of a platform used
to automate a stock 2013 Ford Focus EV. The platform is low-cost and open-source to
encourage collaboration and provide a starting point for fellow researchers to advance the
work in the field of automated vehicle control. This thesis starts by discussing the process
of obtaining control of the vehicle by taking advantage of internal communication protocols.
The controller design process is detailed and a description of the components and software
used to control the vehicle is provided. The automated system is tested and the results of
fully autonomous driving are discussed.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
This thesis details the hardware and software development of an open-source vehicle
automation platform that can be used to automate full-sized vehicles. The methodology
presented includes the reverse engineering process used to control the vehicle using the
vehicle’s internal communication architecture, the model identification approach, and the
controller design. In addition, this thesis discusses certain vehicle security concerns that
were discovered during the reverse engineering stage of the project. This platform is intended to help other researchers begin work in the field of automated vehicles more quickly
by providing a platform that can be easily implemented on a variety of vehicles.

1.1

Literature Review
In recent years, the automotive industry has been automating vehicle systems to aid

drivers with features such as adaptive cruise control, lane keeping, and collision avoidance
[1]. In more advanced systems, that are not commercially available, vehicles can drive
themselves to user defined destinations [2]. Though these driver aid systems are just starting
to emerge in production vehicles, research has been conducted for many years to help
develop this technology [3]. The benefits of automated vehicles extend beyond convenience,
and include safer roadways, increased highway throughput, and reduced emissions. Despite
these positive effects of vehicle automation, there are possible drawbacks, and considerations
should be made regarding the safety and security of these automated systems. Hackers are
constantly reviewing platforms in search of exploitable vulnerabilities, and these automated
features provide attack opportunities that were previously unavailable. For example, in [4]
and [5], Miller and Valasek showed that it was possible to exploit the parking assist and
lane keeping features of modern vehicles to gain limited control of acceleration and steering.
In [6], Koscher et al. demonstrate the ability to disable the braking system of modern
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vehicles.
Control of Automated Ground Vehicles (AGV’s) has been a subject of research since
1955 [9] and has naturally progressed to include commercially available passenger vehicles.
In [3], Rajamani details various challenges and approaches for modeling vehicle dynamics
and designing subsystems to control passenger vehicles.
There have been several automated vehicle competitions held to further the research
in this field. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) Grand Challenge.
For example, was started in 2004 to encourage researchers to develop off-road autonomous
vehicle technology that could be used for military applications [10]. The challenge was
repeated in 2005 for off-road vehicles [11]. Then in 2007, the challenge was altered to focus
on urban driving environments [12]. The teams in these challenges started with an existing
commercial vehicle, and developed an automated system to complete the challenge. The
Grand Cooperative Driving Challenge (GCDC) is another example of the advancement of
automated driving through competition [13]. The purpose of the GCDC is to examine
cooperative automated vehicle systems. Teams develop an automated vehicle to be used in
cooperative challenges with other teams. In contrast to the work by the teams in the DARPA
Grand Challenge and GCDC, this work is open-source, low-cost, and has been completed
without vendor support. One purpose of this work is to allow other researchers to perform
vehicle automation tasks similar those in these challenges without needing support from
industry.
In [14], Dias et al. perform longitudinal model identification and design a speed controller for an autonomous vehicle. For model identification, a pseudo random binary signal
(PRBS) was used to obtain the vehicle response to a series of binary step inputs. The
data from this input was used to solve for unknown vehicle parameters and verified using an autoregressive exogenous moving average (ARX) model. Though this approach was
attempted in the current work, a more simple approach using the step response was ultimately used. Once the acceleration and braking systems were identified in [14], a control
system was developed for each input device. The control loops for accelerator and braking
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were connected by switching logic to determine whether the accelerator or brakes should be
used. A similar two-loop control system with a switching logic component was used for the
longitudinal controller in the current work. However, the current work is open-source and
uses the Robot Operating System (ROS) [15].
Ferrin et al., implemented a state feedback controller on a differentially flat Unmanned
Aerial Vehicle (UAV) system in [16]. The high level controller structure and differentially
flat techniques were modified for ground vehicles and implemented in this work.
Koscher et al. and Checkoway et al. in [17] and [6] showed that an attacker can
gain access to Electronic Control Units (ECU’s) and circumvent vehicle control and safety
systems. They also demonstrated that the attacker could gain access to the Controller
Area Network (CAN) bus remotely, and perform similar attacks. Their results included
the ability to have the car ignore a brake pedal press by the driver, a complete vehicle
shut down, and complete control of the visual display. The attacks however, did not allow
for arbitrary control of acceleration, braking or steering; which are all required for vehicle
autonomy.
Miller and Valasek built on the work from Koscher et. al. and Checkoway et. al.
in [4] and [5], which detail attacks on vehicle systems in a 2010 Ford Escape, 2010 Toyota
Prius, and a 2014 Jeep Cherokee. They developed an extensive platform for attacking
ECU’s and exploiting driver assist systems. However, the attacks had limited scope for
vehicle control. For example, an attack on the parking assist module was conducted on
the 2010 Ford Escape, whereby, vehicle steering could be controlled when the vehicle was
traveling at under 5 mph. However, this attack would not work if the vehicle was moving
faster. They also demonstrated the ability to cause vehicle acceleration under very specific
conditions. In contrast, this work demonstrates the ability to cause arbitrary acceleration
under any condition. In addition, using the approach presented here, the acceleration can
be controlled from the OBD-II port, any bus tap point, or by gaining access to an ECU.
The current work also demonstrates the security concern that a vehicle could be examined
and reverse engineered in a short amount of time, as it took a small team of students just
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under a year to develop the automated system for a commercial vehicle.

1.2

Contributions
The contributions of this thesis are as follows:
• The process of reverse engineering the communication protocols of the CAN modules
and sensors in the 2013 Ford Focus Electric is detailed in Chapter 2. Two approaches
for obtaining remote control of the vehicle are examined: CAN message injection and
sensor emulation.
• Security concerns involving the communication architecture of the vehicle are presented. Arbitrary vehicle acceleration is demonstrated by injecting CAN messages
from a tap point on the bus, and through the on-board diagnostics port (OBD-II).
• A simple model identification approach using the step response for the available inputs is given in Chapter 3. The design for the speed and steering controllers is also
presented.
• Chapter 4 discusses the high-level path follower controller design using differential
flatness and state-feedback.
• Chapter 5 gives an overview of the platform architecture and details the hardware
and software components of the automation platform.

The experimental results for the controllers and resulting automated vehicle are given in
Chapter 6. The findings are summarized and the thesis is concluded in Chapter 7.
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CHAPTER 2
EMULATE COMMUNICATIONS AND ENABLE REMOTE CONTROL

This chapter details the efforts of a group of undergraduate researchers at Utah State
University in reverse engineering the communication signals of a 2013 Ford Focus EV.
Methods for identifying sensor output signals and CAN messages are discussed and results
from the vehicle of interest are presented. An approach injecting CAN messages to cause vehicle acceleration is given, and a sensor emulation approach is shown to control acceleration,
braking, and steering.
A team of undergraduate students in the Electrical and Mechanical Engineering programs at Utah State University (including the author of this work) was assembled to explore
the 2013 Ford Focus Electric and reverse engineer the communication protocols. The work
from this team is detailed in the first part of this chapter. The reverse engineering project
lasted from November 2015 to May 2016. The next stage of the project was led by the
author of this work, and his research partner, Chase Kunz. It is important to note the
collaboration effort with Chase, and identify his contributions. In particular, Chase was
instrumental in developing the CAN injection architecture and in discovering the message
required to accelerate the vehicle through CAN message insertion (Chapter 2.2). He also
helped with the model identification and low-level controller design (Chapter 3).

2.1

Vehicle Architecture and Approach
Modern vehicles use a Controller Area Network (CAN) bus system for module-to-

module communication [18]. Electronic Control Units (ECU’s) are the CAN modules that
connect to the bus that send and receive information. A CAN module receives data from
sensors, processes the data, and generates the appropriate CAN message to be broadcast
on the bus using an analog-to-digital operation.
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The research team for the current work used the 2013 Ford Focus Electric Wiring
Guide [19] and the Auto Repair Reference Center Research Database from EBSCOhost [20]
to understand signal path and critical connections. The wiring guide provided diagrams for
most of the wires in the vehicle, and included diagrams and pin-outs for the wiring connections. The Auto Repair Reference Center was particularly useful for reverse engineering
the CAN protocols. It contains the CAN messages generated and received by each module,
diagrams of the four CAN buses in the vehicle, and the module layout on each bus. The
CAN message information was an incomplete list of general messages sent between CAN
modules. For example, the list would indicate that a message about the acceleration pedal
position is sent from one module to another, but it would not indicate the structure of the
message, the arbitration ID, or a conversion to useful units.
Using these resources, the team identified sensors and modules that could be used
for vehicle control. Table 2.1 summarizes these findings. In addition, the team took a
hands-on approach to vehicle exploration, and verified the location and connections of these
components.
The examination of this architecture led to the identification of the two possible controller insertion strategies, as shown in Fig. 2.1. First, the CAN lines between the control
module and the CAN bus could be cut, and a controller could be inserted to intercept
and change messages being sent from the target control module. Second, the analog signal
wires from the target sensor could be cut, and the controller could be inserted between the
sensor and the control module. In either strategy, the controller would insert spurious data
into the system to control the vehicle. The details and results of these two approaches are
discussed in the following subsections.
In order to successfully implement the first controller insertion strategy and take advantage of the information on the vehicle CAN bus, the Vector CANalyzer [21] system was
used for the initial CAN message identification process. This system provides an excellent
visual tool for watching CAN messages in real time. The tool displays a table of CAN
messages with rows organized by arbitration ID. The first column of the table indicates the
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Controller Insertion Type 1 - CAN Message Injection
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Automatic Braking System Module
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Fig. 2.1: Vehicle CAN bus and sensor architecture. Controller insertion type 1 filters CAN
messages and replaces data with the message to be injected, and is represented by a filled
black square. Controller insertion type 2 emulates sensor output signals, and are represented
by filled black circles. The TCM controls the main drive motor of the electric vehicle, and
therefore actuates acceleration. The PSCM actuates the power steering motor. The ABS
module actuates the hydraulic braking system.
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Table 2.1: Sensor and Module Connections for Control Signals
Sensor
Accelerator Pedal Position Sensor
Brake Pedal Position Sensor
Steering Torque Sensor
Steering Wheel Angle Sensor

CAN Module
Powertrain Control Module (PCM)
Automatic Braking System (ABS)
Power Steering Control Module (PSCM)
Steering Angle Sensor Module (SASM)

CAN Message
Accelerator Pedal Position
Brake Pedal Position
Steering Torque
Steering Wheel Angle

CAN Arbitration ID
0x204
0x7D
Unknown
0x10

time since the last message with a given arbitration ID was received. The second column
lists the arbitration ID, and the third column shows the value for each byte of the CAN
message. If a byte is changed when a new message is received, the byte is displayed in
bold. Over time, the byte fades to a light gray if that value stays the same. This was
useful in identifying messages such as the accelerator pedal position, brake pedal position,
steering wheel angle, and vehicle speed. The CANalyzer system is a great resource, but it
is expensive and closed-source. Cheaper alternatives such as the Peak Systems PCAN [22]
device can be used that have an open platform for development. An open-source solution
for monitoring CAN traffic with the PCAN device is provided with the open-source software
accompanying this work. Further discussion on the use of the PCAN device can be found
in Chapter 5.1. Another alternative is to use a microcontroller with a CAN bus interface
module to monitor and report CAN traffic [23].
Using the resources in the previous paragraphs, it was determined that CAN messages
have two main functions: status and control. A status message reports the status of a vehicle
component or condition, but does not control that component or condition. For example,
a module will receive input from the wheel speed sensors and send the information on the
CAN bus. Changing the data in this message will not result in a change of vehicle speed.
A control message, however, is sent by a module to control a component or condition of the
vehicle. For example, the movement of the wing mirrors is controlled by a CAN signal, and
when this message is changed, the mirrors will move in response.

2.2

CAN Message Injection
A platform for injecting CAN messages was developed using the TI TM4C129XL mi-

crocontroller evaluation kit [23] and TI CAN transceivers [24]. The platform would connect
to the CAN bus using the first controller insertion point, located between the target module
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and the bus. The microcontroller was programmed to record and playback CAN traffic.
More specifically, the microcontroller would receive the output from the control module
and store it in memory. Upon user request, the output from the control module could be
injected on the CAN bus. This platform was used to determine which messages, organized
by arbitration ID, were generated by the target control module. Using information from
the Auto Repair Center Research Database, it was determined that the Powertrain Control
Module (PCM) sent a CAN message to the Transmission Control Module (TCM) regarding
the accelerator pedal position. In addition, the PCM was the only control module that received the sensor signal from the accelerator pedal. For these reasons, the PCM was chosen
as the target module for vehicle acceleration.
The connector diagrams in the Wiring Guide were used to determine the CAN bus
connections to the PCM. These wires were cut and routed to the CAN injection platform.
The CAN messages output from the PCM were recorded and passed through to the CAN
bus for an accelerator pedal press. The recorded data was then played back on the bus and
the vehicle accelerated as expected. Additional code was added to the playback function to
selectively playback messages based on the message arbitration ID. This was used to search
the recorded data set and isolate the acceleration control message. The messages were
separated into two groups based on their arbitration ID, and each group was played back
to the vehicle separately. The group that resulted in vehicle acceleration was separated
again into two smaller groups. The process was repeated until one message arbitration
ID was left. The acceleration control message was determined to be the message with
arbitration ID 0x11A. Figs. 2.2 and 2.3 show successful CAN injections of the acceleration
control message and the resulting speed for a ramp and step input, respectively. Due to the
similarities between the acceleration control message and a throttle signal in a gas powered
car, this message is called the throttle message for the rest of this work.
Another approach to identify useful CAN messages for vehicle acceleration is by correlating the CAN messages with the vehicle speed. This approach was attempted by recording
an accelerator pedal press and processing the data in Matlab. The CAN modules for the
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2013 Ford Focus EV broadcast messages at prescribed frequencies; as opposed to broadcasting in response to another signal. The speed message for the vehicle is broadcast at
100 Hz, which is the highest frequency messages are broadcast for this vehicle. Correlation
was performed on messages of the same frequency, and the speed data was downsampled to
perform correlation with messages at lower frequencies. The correlation returned a value
between -1 and 1 for each byte of every message to indicate how closely correlated that byte
was to the speed message. If the byte did not change during the recording, the correlation
returned NAN. On the EV-HS CAN bus, there are 102 different messages; each message
contains 8 bytes. The bytes were sorted based on the absolute value of the correlation value
to identify the highest positively or negatively correlated bytes. The bytes that had a NAN
value were rejected, and the final number of bytes being ranked was 341. The highest correlated byte of 0x11A was byte 4, which had a correlation value of 0.2359 and was ranked
57 out of 341. The low correlation value and rank indicates that the throttle message would
not have been identified using this strategy. In contrast, using the approach described in
the previous paragraph, the throttle message was identified and was used to control vehicle
acceleration.
The investigation of the braking system concluded that a CAN bus message about
pedal position would not actuate the hydraulic braking system. The pedal signal is sent
directly to the Automatic Braking System (ABS) CAN module, which is the only CAN
module on the vehicle that is connected to the hydraulic brake lines. From this, it was
concluded that braking could not be fully controlled through the CAN bus.
The 2013 Ford Focus EV has an option to include park assist [25]. Though our specific
vehicle did not include this option, it was determined that the Electric Power Assisted
Steering (EPAS) system had the same part number and motor as the EPAS system in a
vehicle with the park assist feature. This meant that the power steering motor would be
powerful enough to turn the wheel at low speeds, and by extension, any speed. The Power
Steering Control Module (PSCM) receives inputs from the CAN bus and the steering torque
sensor located at the base of the steering column. The torque sensor uses a torsion bar to
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Fig. 2.2: CAN ramp injection from controller insertion point 1 and resulting vehicle speed.
Data gathered from CAN bus and represented in hexadecimal format.

Fig. 2.3: CAN step injection from controller insertion point 1 and resulting vehicle speed.
Data gathered from CAN bus and represented in hexadecimal format.
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determine the amount of torque being applied by the driver, which is used by the PSCM
to determine how much assist the power steering motor should provide. Simply, for a given
torque input, less assistance would be provided by the EPAS system at higher speeds.
Similar to the brake system, the input of interest is sent from a sensor to the module that
performs the desired action. This led to the conclusion that the control of steering would
have to be controlled through torque sensor input, and not through the CAN bus. In
addition, the work by Miller and Valasek [5] [4] identifies the shortcomings of exploiting
the park assist feature; the park assist feature will cease to control the vehicle if the speed
threshold is exceeded.

2.3

Sensor Emulation
The CAN bus injection method was unable to control braking and steering, so the

sensor emulation method was explored. The accelerator pedal position sensor was analyzed
to control vehicle acceleration, the brake pedal position sensor was analyzed to control the
braking system, and the steering torque sensor was analyzed to control the vehicle steering.
Fig. 2.4 shows these sensors, and the following paragraphs discuss the analysis.
The accelerator pedal position (APP) sensor is located at the top of the accelerator
pedal. There are six wires connected to the APP sensor, including two 5 V power wires with
corresponding ground wires, and two signal wires. The sensor power pins were connected to
a voltage source, and the signal wires were connected to an oscilloscope. It was determined
that the sensor outputs two DC voltages similar to the output of potentiometers. Fig. 2.6
shows the voltage levels of the two output signals in response to a pedal press. The third
signal on the graph is a multiplier that relates the two signals. It is seen that V1 ≈ 2V2 .
The brake pedal position (BPP) sensor is located at the top of the brake pedal. There
are four wires connected to the BPP, including a 5 V power, ground, and two signal wires.
The BPP was connected to the voltage source and oscilloscope in the same manner as the
APP. However, the BPP outputs two PWM signals instead of DC voltage levels. When the
brake pedal is not pressed, the duty cycles of the signals settle at 89% for signal 1, and 11%
for signal 2. During a braking event, the duty cycle for signal 1 decreases, and the duty
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Fig. 2.4: The physical sensors emulated for vehicle control. Top: Steering rack for 2013
Ford Focus EV, the steering torque sensor is located at the base of the steering column
and measures torque from driver. Bottom Left: The APP sensor located at the top of the
accelerator pedal. Bottom Right: The BPP sensor that is usually mounted behind the brake
pedal assembly, which measures the brake pedal press.

Fig. 2.5: Aerial view of the Electric Vehicle Roadway and Research Facility (EVR) at Utah
State University.
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Fig. 2.6: Acceleration pedal position sensor output. Two analog voltage signals related by
V1 = 2V2 .
cycle for signal 2 increases at the same rate. Fig. 2.7 shows the two PWM signals for the
BPP. The frequency of signal 1 is 533 Hz and the frequency of signal 2 is 482 Hz.
The steering torque sensor is located at the base of the steering column. The sensor
connects to the Power Steering Control Module (PSCM) on the CAN bus, which determines
the amount of power steering assist to provide. The assist is provided by an electric motor
connected to the steering rack. In the sensor, a torsion bar is used to connect two parts
of the steering shaft, where the rotational displacement can be measured to determine the
torque input by the driver [26]. Similar to the BPP, there are 4 wires connected to the
steering torque sensor, including 5 V power, ground, and two signal wires. The steering
torque sensor was connected to the voltage source and oscilloscope, and it was determined
that the sensor outputs two PWM signals on the signal wires, where both signals settle
at 50% duty cycle when no torque is applied on the steering wheel. Both signals have a
frequency of 2.15 kHz. Similar to the brake PWM signals, the duty cycles always add to
100%, and the direction that the steering wheel is being turned determines which signal’s
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Fig. 2.7: Brake pedal position sensor output signals. Signal 1: 89% resting duty cycle at
533 Hz. Signal 2: 11% resting duty cycle at 482 Hz.
duty cycle increases, and which signal’s duty cycle decreases. Fig. 2.8 shows the two steering
PWM signals.

2.4

CAN Message Injection Through OBD-II
In 1996, the OBD-II (On-Board Diagnostics) specification was required to be imple-

mented on any new vehicle sold in the United States [27]. This specification gives owners
and technicians the ability to diagnose issues on the vehicle. The specification standardized
connectors, message formats, and frequencies. The OBD-II port on the 2013 Ford Focus
EV connects to the EV-HS CAN bus, which is the same bus that the throttle message is
sent from the PCM to the TCM.
An attack platform was developed to inject arbitrary throttle messages through the
diagnostics port. This attack method was important because, if successful, it would demonstrate that the acceleration of the vehicle could be controlled with limited intrusion. This
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Fig. 2.8: Steering torque sensor output signals. 50% resting duty cycles at 2.15 kHz.
differed from the approach in Chapter 2.2, as it does not require access to the target module,
or that the CAN wires be cut and re-routed. Instead, this platform could be plugged into
the OBD-II port and monitor the bus for the target message arbitration ID. Also, it would
show that if an attacker was able to inject messages from any module on the EV-HS CAN
bus, then arbitrary vehicle acceleration could be caused. This would stand in contrast to
the findings in [4], [5], [6], [17], where the acceleration of the vehicle could only be controlled
under specific preconditions and required intrusive access to the CAN bus.
The platform was connected to the CAN bus through the OBD-II port (other points on
the bus could be used, as well) and monitored the traffic on the bus. The user determined a
target message, in this case, the throttle message, and provided that message arbitration ID
to the system. In Chapter 2.2, it was determined that the throttle message is included in the
data frame associated with arbitration ID 0x11A, and is broadcast at 10 Hz. The platform
waited until a message was received with the corresponding arbitration ID, and would
replace throttle message data with an arbitrary throttle command value. The platform
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was designed to only alter the parts of the message that relate to the throttle control.
The inserted message would be sent 250 µs after the actual message, leaving 9.75 ms for
the inserted message to be received and processed by the TCM. This allowed the inserted
message to dominate the period and cause the vehicle to accelerate. Fig. 2.9 shows the
successful ramp injection through the OBD-II port and the resulting vehicle speed. Thus
confirming the hypothesis that vehicle acceleration can be caused by injecting CAN messages
through the OBD-II port, and therefore, could be caused at any other point on the bus.
These results demonstrate a CAN bus security concern. If an attacker were able to
access the CAN bus, physically, or by compromising another ECU, they would be able
to effect the acceleration of the vehicle without causing any errors. Remote access to the
vehicle, but not necessarily the requisite CAN bus, could be affected by compromising the
Telematic Control Unit (TCU) or a wireless Tire Pressure Monitoring Sensor (TPMS).
The TPMS sends a signal to the Body Control Module (BCM), which in turn transmits
a message on the medium speed CAN bus (MS-CAN), while the TCU is connected to the
I-CAN bus (it is unlikely, however, that compromising a sensor would allow for injection of
arbitrary CAN messages onto the I-CAN or MS-CAN bus). These buses are connected to
the EV-HS bus through a gateway module; transmitting a message from one bus to another,
which would be required for either the TCU or TPMS to impersonate the PCM by passing
APP messages, was not explored in this work. Regardless of the access approach, the driver
is able to stop the unwanted acceleration by pressing the brake pedal. However, other works
indicate that it is possible to make the vehicle ignore braking requests [5] [4] [17] [6]. This
was not investigated as part of this work. Another security concern is that of a malicious
technician. Since technicians will often access the OBD-II port when a vehicle is being
serviced, it would be quite simple for them to leave an OBD-II injection platform connected
to the OBD-II port. The acceleration control could be initiated remotely, or by a timer,
causing the vehicle to accelerate at a dangerous time.
We present two remediation strategies that could be employed to help protect against
this vulnerability. First, a simple change in the acceleration system architecture, such
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Fig. 2.9: CAN ramp injection through OBD-II port with resulting vehicle speed. Injected
throttle message was sent on bus immediately following car throttle message. Values read
from CAN bus and displayed in hexadecimal format.
that the APP sensor connects directly to the TCM, which is the actuating module. This
would remove the need of a throttle message to be sent from the PCM to the TCM and
effectively remove the attack surface. The second approach is through device fingerprinting
for both the digital and analog signals [28] [29]. This would allow the receiving module to
authenticate the transmitting module, and prevent this type of attack.
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CHAPTER 3
MODEL IDENTIFICATION AND LOW-LEVEL CONTROLLER DESIGN

This chapter details the model identification techniques used in this work. A simple first
order step response technique was used to design low-level controllers to control vehicle speed
and steering wheel angle. The design process of the low-level controllers is also discussed.
A simple overview of the control structure for the automated vehicle platform is shown
in Fig. 3.1. The high-level controller receives the path and provides the desired vehicle
speed, vdesired , and desired steering wheel angle, θdesired . Discussion on the high-level
controller can be found in Chapter 4. The low-level controllers discussed in this chapter are
the inner loops that control vehicle speed and steering wheel angle. The vehicle commands
are τcmd , AP Pcmd , and BP Pcmd . These vehicle commands represent steering torque, APP,
and brake pedal position, respectively.
The first step in the development of the low level controllers was to determine a model
of the system being controlled. A system model is expressed as a transfer function relating
the input to the output of the system. Models were identified to relate the accelerator
and brake pedal inputs to vehicle velocity, and steering wheel angle to vehicle heading.
The following subsections review the model identification approach, and low level controller
design process for the Ford Focus.

3.1

Longitudinal Model
The longitudinal characteristics of the vehicle are affected by the APP sensor, and the

BPP sensor. These two systems were tested and identified separately, then implemented
together as a complete longitudinal model.
In [14], Dias et al. perform longitudinal model identification and controller design for
an autonomous vehicle. This approach was examined for the current work, however, a
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more straightforward classical controls technique using step responses was ultimately used.
Once the acceleration and braking systems were identified, a control system was developed
for each input device. The control loops for accelerator and braking were connected by
switching logic to determine whether the accelerator or brakes should be used. A similar
two loop control system with a switching logic component was used for the longitudinal
controller in the current work. However, this work is an open-source project that uses the
Robot Operating System (ROS) [15].
For the APP sensor system identification, the vehicle was placed on a dynamometer [30]
and step inputs were initiated on the APP sensor from 4% to 15%, at increments of 1%.
Fig. 3.2 shows the step responses for some accelerator pedal inputs. It was observed that
for a given APP percentage, the vehicle would eventually settle at a specific speed. The
relationship between APP and speed can be described by a first order transfer function.
The general equation for a first order transfer function, G(s), can be represented by

G(s) =

K
.
τs + 1

(3.1)

Where K is the constant or equation that relates APP to vehicle speed, and τ is the system
time constant. The equation for K was derived from a linear fit of the a scatter plot of max
speeds from the step input, as shown in Fig. 3.3, and given by

f (x) = 3.65x − 9.7.

(3.2)

Where f (x) is the vehicle speed, and x is the APP percentage. The test track (shown in Fig.
2.5) where the vehicle was operating is an oval track with sharp corners on the north and
south side. The sharp corners and the short straightaways limit the vehicle operating speeds
to between 15 and 25 mph for the initial automation. The τ value that best represented the
vehicle response between 15 and 25 mph was chosen as the time constant for accelerator
pedal input in the longitudinal model. Fig. 3.4 shows the time constants for varying APP
percentages. The time constant for the accelerator pedal input was chosen to be 7 seconds,
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Fig. 3.1: High-level system block diagram. Shows low-level control loop for lateral and
longitudinal control and high-level differential flatness path following feedback loop.
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Fig. 3.2: APP step response for 5%, 10%, and 15% pedal presses. The graph shows a
general first order speed response for a given pedal percentage.
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Fig. 3.5: Deceleration rate for BPP step input of 15%. The figure shows a first order
relationship between BPP percentage and deceleration rate.
as this best represented the system response for the nominal operating conditions.
For BPP system identification, the vehicle was driven in a large, flat, asphalt area at
speeds ranging from 5 to 25 mph, at 5 mph increments. The vehicle was accelerated to
the desired speed by a driver. Once the vehicle obtained the desired speed, an input to
the braking system was initiated through the ROS system discussed in Chapter 5. Step
inputs were initiated, ranging from 5% to 50% of BPP percentage, at increments of 5%
for each speed value. The speed data seemed to show a consistent rate of change for
a given BPP percentage. To confirm this, the speed data was smoothed using a 5 point
moving average. The derivative of the smoothed data was taken by calculating the difference
between successive data points, and dividing by the elapsed time between data points. Fig.
3.5 shows the vehicle deceleration due to a braking event. It was observed that the settling
value for the deceleration rate was consistent for a given BPP percentage and varying speeds,
which concluded that the longitudinal model was independent of current vehicle speed.
This speed independence can be seen in Fig. 3.6, where each line shows the deceleration
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rate for a given BPP percentage. At low BPP values, the lines converge, meaning that
deceleration is unaffected by very small brake pedal percentages. However, at higher brake
pedal percentages, the lines show distinct deceleration rates regardless of the vehicle speed.
To show the relationship between BPP percentage and deceleration, an average was taken
for each BPP value across each of the speeds. The result of this operation is shown in Fig.
3.7.
Similar to the APP model, the relationship between BPP and deceleration could be
described by a first order transfer function. After analyzing the deceleration curves at different BPP percentages and for different speeds, the system time constant, τ , was calculated
to be 0.3 seconds. The equation that relates BPP to deceleration was determined by finding
a curve fit algorithm for the curve in Fig. 3.7. This would result in an equation that would
provide a BPP percentage for a desired deceleration rate. The equation for K is given by

f (x) = −0.0018x2 + 0.029x − 0.3768,

(3.3)

where f (x) is the deceleration, and x is the BPP percentage. This equation is used to
describe K from the general first order transfer function equation.

3.2

Lateral Model
The lateral model of the vehicle was determined by step response analysis. The model

relates an input from the steering torque sensor to changes in the steering wheel angle. As
discussed in Chapter 2.3, the torque sensor measures the torque applied by the driver, and
sends that information to the PSCM. The PSCM activates the power assist motor that
connects to the steering rack, and moves the wheels. The steering wheel angle is measured
by a sensor in the steering wheel and output on the CAN bus.
Step inputs were initiated on the steering torque duty cycle signal, ranging from 50%
to 63%, at 1% increments. Tests were performed at a large, flat, asphalt area with vehicle
speeds ranging from 5 mph to 25 mph. Fig. 3.8 shows the results of the step input tests
performed at 25 mph. It was observed that a general first order transfer function could
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Fig. 3.7: Average deceleration settling rates due to BPP step input percentages.
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be used to describe the relationship between steering torque duty cycle and steering wheel
angle. However, at lower speeds and higher torque values, this observation is not valid. Fig.
3.9 shows the step response of the steering system at 15 mph. At the higher torque values,
the steering wheel angles do not settle to a consistent steering wheel angle. It was also
observed that the settling angles for a given steering torque duty cycle are not consistent
for varying speeds. Therefore, the lateral model identification is speed dependent and
would require a speed dependent limit on the steering torque duty cycle. Providing these
characteristics, the system can still be modeled as first order transfer function for a given
speed.
The steering data was analyzed in order to determine the gain equation, K, and the
time constant, τ . Time constants were calculated for each step input response, and for each
speed. Fig. 3.10 Bottom shows the time constants for given steering torque duty cycles.
Each of the lines indicates the speed at which the test was performed. It can be seen that at
low speeds and low duty cycles, the time constants are not consistent, but at higher speeds,
the inconsistencies lessen. A time constant, τ , of 0.2 seconds was chosen to optimize for
typical vehicle operation.
Since the lateral system was found to be speed dependent, the gain equation K must
also be speed dependent. The step input tests were performed at 5 mph increments so a gain
equation K would be found for each speed value. These gain equations relate steering torque
duty cycle to steering wheel angle. Fig. 3.10 shows the settling angles for varying steering
torque duty cycles when the vehicle was traveling at 25 mph. A curve fit approximation was
completed for this data set, and a solution was determined by solving the given equation.
For this data set, the given equation for K is

f (x) = 59.4x2 − 6802.7x + 195084.5,

(3.4)

where f (x) is the steering wheel angle, and x is the steering torque duty cycle.
Figs. 3.8 and 3.9 show the step response of the vehicle due to steering torque input
signals. The graphs do not include step input values below 58% because the step responses
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input and steering wheel angle.
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at such values had little effect on the steering wheel angle. This exposed a deadband in the
response from the steering torque sensor input to the steering wheel angle. A deadband
compensation algorithm was implemented to mitigate the effects of this non-linearity. As
shown in Fig. 3.1, the deadband compensation code was executed just before the signal
was sent to the vehicle. If the torque input value was greater than 50%, then

τcmd = Bmax +

τ − 50
(τmax − Bmax )
τmax − 50

(3.5)

was used to compensate for the deadband. If the torque input value was less than 50%,
then
τcmd = Bmin +

50 − τ
(τmin − Bmin )
50 − τmin

(3.6)

was used to compensate for the deadband. Where τcmd is the torque command sent to
the vehicle, τ is the value received from the PI controller, Bmax is the upper limit of the
deadband, Bmin is the lower limit of the deadband, τmax is the maximum allowed value for
the steering torque signal, and τmin is the minimum allowed steering torque signal. For the
deadband on the 2013 Ford Focus EV, the upper and lower limits were 55% and 45%, and
the maximum and minimum values for the torque signal were 64% and 37%, respectively.

3.3

PI Controller Design
Low-level control loops were designed to control vehicle speed and steering wheel angle.

The desired speed and desired steering wheel angle would be input to the low-level control
loops from a user or high-level controller. The low-level longitudinal controller interfaced
with the accelerator and brake pedals to effect vehicle speed. A separate loop was designed
for each vehicle input, and switching logic was used to choose whether the acceleration or
brake loop would be used. The low-level lateral controller would receive the desired steering
wheel angle and determine the appropriate input to the steering torque sensor to achieve
the desired angle.
A Proportional Integral (PI) Feedback Controller was implemented for longitudinal
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and lateral control. Fig. 3.11 shows a basic PI Feedback Controller for a first order system.
The transfer function block represents the vehicle and contains the system model. The
1
K

block effectively cancels out the gain equation K, and helps relate the speed error to a

vehicle input. For example, in the longitudinal controller, the K equation receives the APP
as an input, and outputs speed. Therefore, the input to the transfer function block must be
an APP value. However, the control loop is calculating a speed error, so the output of the
PI block is a speed value. The

1
K

block translates the speed value into appropriate APP

value.
Since the K and

1
K

can be combined to equal 1, they can be ignored in the loop

equation. The open loop transfer function of this system is then given by
1
.
(τ s + 1)

GOL (s) =

(3.7)

Closing the feedback loop and adding the PI controller gives

GCL (s) =



kp
τ

s2 +



1
τ

s+

+

kp
τ

ki
kp




s+

ki
τ

.

(3.8)

The system is stable if the real part of the closed-loop poles are negative. Solving for the
closed loop poles and zero yields
− (kp + 1) ±
s=

q
(kp + 1)2 − 4ki τ
2τ

Controller
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−

PI

1
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,

(3.9)

Vehicle Model
K
τ s+1
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Fig. 3.11: General control loop for a first order PI controller.
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and
s=−

ki
,
kp

(3.10)

respectively. From these equations, it can be determined that if kp and ki are positive, the
system will be stable.
The second order transfer function obtained through closing the loop can be written,
in a general form, as
ωn2
.
s2 + 2ζωn s + ωn2

(3.11)

Where ζ is the damping coefficient and ωn is the natural frequency. The damping coefficient
determines whether the system will be under damped, over damped, or critically damped,
and the natural frequency helps to determine the time constant for the system. The time
constant, τ , is given by the equation τ =

1
ζωn .

Values were chosen for the damping coefficient

and the time constant to define the system behavior. From these values, one can determine
the appropriate kp and ki for the system. The equations for kp and ki are given by


1
,
kp = τ 2ζωn −
τ

(3.12)

ki = τ ωn2 ,

(3.13)

and

respectively. Table 3.1 shows the calculated values for each of the control inputs, where the
τcar column shows the time constants found during model identification and are internal
vehicle parameters.

Table 3.1: Parameters for Low-Level Controllers
Input
τcar ζ
τ
ωn kp
ki
Accelerator Pedal
7
1 0.5
2
27 28
Brake Pedal
0.3 1 0.5
2 0.2 1.2
Steering Torque
0.2 1 0.33 3 0.2 1.8
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CHAPTER 4
HIGH-LEVEL CONTROLLER DESIGN

This chapter discusses the high-level path following controller design. The system is
shown to be differentially flat and a state feedback approach with a feed forward term is
presented.
The high-level controller was designed to take a desired trajectory or path, and provide
appropriate inputs for the low-level controllers. There are a number of high-level control
strategies for manned and unmanned vehicle control [31] [32] [33]. The control strategy
should be determined by the system characteristics and the system objectives. This platform
was to be used on a ground vehicle to track a desired trajectory and was determined to
be differentially flat [34] for the chosen states. A differentially flat system is one in which
the output is a function of the system states, the input, and the derivatives of the input,
and both the states and the input are functions of the output and the derivatives of the
output. Therefore, a simple high level controller using the properties of a differentially flat
system, and state feedback control were chosen [35]. An example control system design for
a differently flat Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) system was demonstrated in [16]. The
following paragraphs discuss differential flatness, and the high-level controller architecture
shown in Fig. 4.1.

4.1

Differential Flatness
A system is said to be differentially flat if there exists an output vector y in the form

of


y = h x, u, u̇, ü, ...., u(r) ,

(4.1)
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Trajectory
pnt , pet , vnt , vet
Differential Flatness
ut = [vnt ; vet ]
xt = [pnt ; pet ]

ut+

u

System

−
ke
x

y

k
xt

x
e
−
+

y=x

Fig. 4.1: High-level system block diagram. Details the high-level control loop, and the path
following algorithm. The system block contains the low-level control loops, and the vehicle.
such that,


x = φ y, ẏ, ÿ, ...., y (r) ,


u = α y, ẏ, ÿ, ...., y (r) ,

(4.2)

where h, φ, and α are smooth functions. The output of the differentially flat system can,
therefore, be defined by a function of the system states, the control input, u, and the
derivatives of u. The state vector and control input vector can each be described by a
function of the flat output, y, and its derivatives.
The state vector for this system was chosen to be
 
pn 
x =  ,
pe

(4.3)
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where pn is the vehicle position in the north direction and pe is the vehicle position in the
east direction. The system input, u, is given by
 
vn 
u =  ,
ve

(4.4)

where vn is the velocity in the north direction and ve is the velocity in the east direction.
The system output, y, is given by
 
pn 
y =  .
pe

(4.5)

From equations 4.3–4.5 it can be concluded that this is a differentially flat system and can
be defined by equations 4.1 and 4.2. The dynamic model of the system is then given by

  
 
0 0 pn  1 0 vn 
ẋ = Ax + Bu = 
  + 
 ,
0 0
pe
0 1
ve

(4.6)

and the output, measured by an RTK-GPS system, is given by

 
1 0 pn 
y = Cx = 
 .
0 1
pe
4.2

(4.7)

Control Architecture
A virtual target scheme was selected for path and trajectory control. The virtual target

data was gathered by driving the vehicle around the test track and recording the RTK-GPS
data at 10 Hz with 2 cm resolution. The recorded data contained the pn , pe , vn , and ve data
and was replayed in the system as a virtual target. The state, input, and output vectors
of the virtual target are denoted as xt , ut , and yt respectively and pnt , pet , vnt , and vet
are the positions and velocities of the virtual target. The goal of the virtual target scheme
is to minimize the difference between the system states and the virtual target states. The
difference between the vehicle states and target states is given by x
e = x − xt , and the input
difference is given by u
e = u − ut . Therefore, the error model is given by x
e˙ = Ae
x + Be
u,
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where u is the commanded velocity vector. Solving for u, and using a state feedback control
strategy, where u
e = −ke
x gives u = ut − ke
x.
The Linear Quadratic Regulator (LQR) method was used to find the optimal gain
value for k. The entries in the system input vector, u, are notated by, u1 and u2 , and are
 
p
used to obtain desired velocity by vd = u21 + u22 , and desired heading by ψd = tan−1 uu12 .
Through calculation and experimentation a relationship was determined between the desired
heading, ψd , and the desired steering wheel angle, θd . Such that, θd = kd ψd . The desired
steering wheel angle and the desired velocity are sent to the low-level controllers discussed
in Chapter 3.
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CHAPTER 5
AUTOMATION PLATFORM OVERVIEW

This chapter details the design and component selection for vehicle automation platform. The hardware and software components are detailed and a link to the software repository is provided.
A versatile and robust platform is required to enable full-sized autonomous vehicle
research. The platform was designed to enable vehicle automation for both the CAN injection and the sensor emulation approaches discussed in Chapter 2.1. For the CAN injection
approach, the platform was able to monitor the CAN bus and inject the desired packets,
whereas for the sensor emulation approach, the platform required access to the output lines
of the sensors to be emulated. In order to proceed to autonomy, the platform required the
ability to sense the environment, determine vehicle location, communicate with the vehicle,
and monitor the CAN bus. A computer running Ubuntu and the Robot Operating System
(ROS) was used to communicate between the platform architectures. The computer was
connected to a microcontroller to allow communication with the vehicle. Fig. 5.1 shows
a diagram of the autonomous system, including the ROS software architecture, hardware
connections to devices, and the vehicle interfacing hardware.
A ROS-based platform was chosen for ease of use, modularity, and sensor interfacing packages. ROS is an open source framework that encourages collaboration between
researchers. People can contribute to the ROS effort by creating software packages that
interface with common sensors and provide tools for development. For example, an opensource software package for ROS was provided by Swift Navigation to interface with the
Piksi RTK-GPS units [36], which helped expedite development time for this project. The
ROS architecture components used in this project are packages, nodes, and topics. A ROS
package is a collection of executable files used to complete a task. Generally packages are
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used to compartmentalize similar parts of a project. ROS nodes are the executable files in
a ROS package that can be written in C/C++ or Python. A ROS topic is a way to transfer
data between nodes. Any node can publish data to a topic, and any node can subscribe to
that topic to receive the data. In this sense, the ROS topic acts as a bus to transfer data.
The following subsections detail the Interfacing Architecture, Sensing Architecture, and
the Computational Architecture of the automation platform.

5.1

Interfacing Architecture
Interfacing devices are critical to the success of vehicle automation as they provide

a way to send commands to the vehicle, and monitor the vehicle for feedback. A PCB
(shown in Fig. 5.2) was designed to provide a connection between the microcontroller and
the vehicle. The following subsections discuss the microcontroller and associated hardware,
and the other interfacing devices used for this platform.

5.1.1

Microcontroller and Associated Hardware

The TI TM4C129XL evaluation kit was the chosen microcontroller platform because
it offered multiple CAN bus interfaces allowing for a combination of CAN injection and
sensor emulation from the same board [23]. The microcontroller receives input from the
computer through a UART module. After performing the appropriate computations, PWM
signals are generated and appropriate DC voltage levels are determined for vehicle input.
The control signals pass through a variety of circuit components to prepare the signals
for vehicle injection. The signals are terminated at solid state relays that select either the
original vehicle signal, or the generated signal to be sent to the vehicle. The user determines
which signal is sent based on a mode switch input to the microcontroller.
The sensor emulation approach requires four PWM signals to be generated by the
microcontroller. The signals are passed through a level shifter to shift the amplitudes from
3.3 V to 5 V, and then sent through operational amplifiers in a voltage follower configuration
to help drive the signals. The PWM signals are then terminated at the normally opened
terminals of solid state relays.
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Fig. 5.1: Platform diagram including the ROS system architecture, hardware device interfaces, and vehicle interfaces.
The accelerator pedal input is generated by a Digital to Analog Converter (DAC) that
receives an I2C signal from the microcontroller. The DAC converts the digital communication to an analog voltage level, and sends it to an active filter IC to clean the signal and
perform a gain two operation to provide the two output signals. The generated signals then
terminate at the normally open terminals of the solid state relays.
Another key feature of the PCB is the safety circuit. Next to the driver there is a
mode switch and an Emergency Stop button. The mode switch allows the driver to switch
between Manual Driving Mode and Autonomous Mode. The power and solid state relay
control signals are routed to the front of the vehicle so the safety driver can switch between
operating modes or press the Emergency stop button to prevent power from reaching the
circuit. The vehicle’s original sensor signals are connected to the normally closed terminals
of the solid state relays, so removing the power returns the vehicle to Manual Mode. Power
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Fig. 5.2: The custom circuit board used to interface with the vehicle CAN bus and generate
the signals required for the sensor emulation approach.
to the circuit is provided by a NewMar DC Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) which
connects to the 12 V car battery, and provides safe and stable voltage levels for the circuit
operations [37]. The NewMar UPS also has an internal backup battery. The voltage level is
stepped down to ± 8 V, 5 V and 3.3 V, and distributed across the custom PCB. The UPS
is shown in Fig. 5.4.

5.1.2

Other Interface Devices

The Peak Systems PCAN device was chosen to monitor CAN traffic [22]. The PCAN
device can connect directly to the vehicle’s OBD-II port, and provides serial output over
USB. A picture of the PCAN device is shown in Fig. 5.3. Every message on the connected
CAN bus is received and sent serially to the computer. The user can determine which CAN
data packets are important to operation, and ignore the rest. One approach to determine
necessary CAN data packets is detailed in Chapter 2.1. Instead of using the CANalyzer
system to monitor CAN traffic, the PCAN device can be used to record CAN traffic for a
desired event (e.g. vehicle acceleration). The CAN data can be replaced section-by-section
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Fig. 5.3: Left: The Piksi RTK-GPS unit with GPS antenna, radio antenna for communication, and the Piksi module. Center: Vector CANalyzer system, used for reverse engineering
CAN messages. Right: The PCAN device used to interface with the vehicle CAN bus for
high-level control feedback.
until a message, or set of messages, is isolated. Additional information on the use of the
PCAN device for system feedback is given in Chapter 5.3.2.
A USB-to-serial device was used between the microcontroller and computer to enable
communication. The control system determines the appropriate inputs to the vehicle and
sends the commands to the microcontroller. The device receives the signal from the USB
port and sends it to a UART module on the microcontroller. More information about the
microcontroller and control system is given in Chapter 5.3.
The TI SN65HVD230 CAN Transceiver Breakout Board [38] [24] was used to connect
the microcontroller to the CAN bus. This board provided a direct connection with the
vehicle CAN bus that can be used for monitoring and injection.

5.2

Sensing Architecture
The Swiftnav Piksi RTK-GPS unit [39] [40] was chosen to provide position and velocity
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Fig. 5.4: The trunk of the 2013 Ford Focus EV with the hardware setup. Left: The
NewMar UPS that connects to the vehicles 12 V battery and supplies power to the circuit
and computer. Center: The custom PCB for interfacing with the vehicle CAN bus and
sensors. Right: Computer running Linux and ROS, connected to the Piksi RTK-GPS
unit(s), PCAN Device, and PCB.
estimates for the vehicle. A picture of the Swiftnav Piksi unit is shown in Fig. 5.3. Swiftnav
provides an inexpensive, open-source RTK-GPS solution that provides GPS measurements
at 10 Hz and ±2 cm accuracy. In order to achieve such high accuracies, the system must
have a base station with an RTK-GPS unit and a second unit mounted to the vehicle. The
two units communicate with radio transceivers at 955 MHz. The unit mounted on the car
connects to a computer over USB and provides position and velocity data. The base station
simply needs a 5 V power supply.
The 2013 Ford Focus EV has an array of sensors on the vehicle that monitor everything
from wheel speed to tire pressure. However, the vehicle does not have high precision wheel
encoders, an RTK-GPS receiver, or inertial measurement sensors (IMU’s) that could be
useful for vehicle automation. The sensor data is typically received by a module and sent
on the CAN bus. Using the PCAN device described in Chapter 5.1, the on-board sensor
information can be provided to the rest of the automation platform. For autonomous
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driving, the accelerator pedal position sensor, brake pedal position sensor, steering wheel
angle sensor, and vehicle speed data are used for feedback in the low-level controllers.
The sensor data broadcast on the CAN bus does not provide the information in empirical units, and sometimes the data is masked with other signals. An important aspect to
the sensing architecture is the conversion from CAN bus messages to useful units. These
conversions could be found experimentally for each message found on the CAN bus, but for
the purposes of this platform the vehicle speed was the only message converted to empirical
units (MPH). The vehicle speed is found on the message with arbitration ID 0x75 on bytes
7 and 8, and is represented by a 16-bit value where byte 7 is the upper byte and byte 8
is the lower byte. When the vehicle was not moving the vehicle speed was represented as
0xB0D4 on the CAN bus. The decimal representation of this constant, 45,268, is subtracted
from the 16-bit vehicle speed to align the 0 MPH value. The vehicle was driven with the
RTK-GPS units to provide a reference for the vehicle speed, and it was determined that the
CAN value would then need to be divided by 54 to achieve an accurate measure of speed.
This process is summarized by

vmph =

(b7 << 8) + b8 − 45268
,
54

(5.1)

where b7 and b8 are the integer representations of bytes 7 and 8 from the CAN message
with arbitration ID 0x75, and the << operator represents a left bit shift.

5.3

Computational Architecture
The computational architecture includes the code required to combine sensor infor-

mation, controller commands, and prepare command insertion. The two computational
platforms used in this system are the microcontroller and ROS. These platforms are discussed in the following sections and code for these platforms can be found at https://github.
com/rajnikant1010/EVAutomation.
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5.3.1

Microcontroller Software

The code for the TI TM4C129XL was written in C and took advantage of the built-in
functionality of the TivaWare Peripheral Driver Library from Texas Instruments [41]. Table
5.1 shows the peripherals used and their functionality. The following paragraphs discuss
the microcontroller code.
The microcontroller receives a serial packet from the computer in the form shown in
Fig. 5.5. The first byte is always 0xFA, the second byte gives the number of bytes in the
payload, the payload contains the steering, braking and acceleration commands to be sent
to the vehicle, and the last two bytes is a 16-bit Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) using the
CRC16-CCITT algorithm to ensure data integrity. Once received, the CRC is calculated to
ensure correct data, and the payload values are stored in appropriate variables. All input
commands are normalized between zero and one. For PWM signals, the normalized value
represents the duty cycle of the signal, where 0.5 represents 50% duty cycle.

5.3.2

ROS Architecture

The ROS architecture consists of a series of packages, nodes, and topics [42]. A ROS
package can be used to modularize code. For example, the four packages used for this project
were swiftnav piksi (GPS), focus serial (serial communication), pcan (CAN interface), and
focus control (high- and low-level control). Each of these packages has at least one node
and publishes or subscribes to certain topics. A program file (either C/C++ or Python)
is written for each node and when a node publishes information to a topic, other nodes

Table 5.1: Microcontroller Peripherals Table
Port
Pin
Type
Purpose
GPIO F
2
PWM
Steering signal 1
GPIO F
3
PWM
Steering signal 2
GPIO F
1
PWM
Brake signal 1
GPIO G
1
PWM
Brake signal 2
GPIO K (I2C4)
6
I2C SCL Acceleration I2C SCL line
GPIO K (I2C4)
7
I2C SDA Acceleration I2C SDA line
GPIO C
4
Logic
Mode select signal from user
GPIO C
5
Logic
Mode signal to system
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0xFA

# of
bytes (n)

BPP, and APP Commands

1-byte

1-byte

n-bytes

Payload: Steering Torque,

CRC16-CCITT
2-bytes

Fig. 5.5: Serial message structure for communication with the microcontroller. The serial
communication sends commands to the vehicle emulating the APP, BPP, and steering torque
sensors. The second byte indicates the number of bytes in the payload, n.
can subscribe to that topic and receive the information that was published. The following
paragraphs will discuss each of the ROS packages, nodes, and topics used for this system.
The swiftnav piksi package has only one node. This node initializes a connection with
the GPS unit, receives the raw GPS data, and packages the data into an Odometry message.
An Odometry message is a standard ROS message that contains information about position,
velocity, angular positions, angular velocities, quaternions, and covariance matrices. The
Odometry message is published to a topic called gps data.
The pcan package has one node called can publisher that receives CAN data from the
PCAN device and parses the requested data. The CAN data is translated to useful units
for the given control strategy, and published to a ROS node called can data. The can data
topic could provide as much CAN information as the user would like. For the purposes of
automating this vehicle, the CAN data of interest is vehicle speed in MPH and steering
wheel angle.
The focus control package has two nodes: gps input and controller. The gps input node
is written in python, and it reads a .mat file with information for a virtual target. The
position and velocity data for the virtual target are published to the gps input topic. The
controller node subscribes to the can data, gps data, and gps input topics. From the data
in these topics, it performs a path following algorithm described in Chapter 4. The path
following algorithm provides a desired turn rate (steering wheel angle) and desired velocity
for the vehicle. The low-level PI controllers discussed in Chapter 3.3 receive the desired
values and calculate the appropriate vehicle commands. The accelerator pedal position,
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brake pedal position, and steering torque duty cycle commands are then published to the
serial data topic.
The focus serial package has one node called serial transmitter. This node subscribes
to the serial data topic and sends the accelerator pedal position, brake pedal position and
steering torque duty cycle information to the microcontroller. Before the data is sent,
a Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) is performed and a checksum is added to the serial
message. The microcontroller checks the CRC to verify the accuracy of the data before
sending the requested commands to the vehicle.
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CHAPTER 6
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS

This chapter provides experimental results for the low-level and high-level controllers.
Path and velocity errors during autonomous driving are also presented.
Experiments were conducted to determine the results of the autonomous vehicle platform. A video of the system in operation and the development process can be found at
https://youtu.be/7ohWIwb6KfM. The low-level controllers were tested with given desired
steering angles and velocities. The low-level steering controller was improved by implementing a deadband compensation algorithm. The results for the low-level controllers are given
in Chapter 6.1.
After the low-level controllers were verified through testing, experiments were conducted for full vehicle automation by including the high-level path following controller.
The automation results are shown in Chapter 6.2.

6.1

Low Level Controller
The low level controllers provide speed and steering wheel angle control through the

user input signal. For the steering controller, the steering wheel torque sensor signal was
used to change the position of the steering wheel. As discussed in Chapter 3, the control
loop was designed such that, given a desired angle, the controller would change the steering
torque value until the desired angle was achieved. This controller was tested using a step
input and a graph of the result can be seen in Fig. 6.1. The y-axis is the steering wheel
angle as represented by a Hex value on the CAN bus. A desired steering wheel angle of
0x7D0 was used as an input to the controller node of the ROS platform. The step response
had a maximum value of 0x891, representing an overshoot of 9.65%. The resulting time
constant of the system was 1.86 seconds. The desired behavior was for the system to be
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critically damped and have a time constant of 0.33 seconds.
After implementing deadband compensation, the lateral controller improved. Fig. 6.2
shows the step response of the lateral controller with deadband compensation. The maximum value for this response is 2,113, which represents a 5.65% overshoot, and has a time
constant of 1.1 seconds.
The result of the longitudinal controller during autonomous driving is shown in Fig.
6.4. The velocity error is shown in Fig. 6.5, where the average error for the autonomous
test was 0.34 mph (0.151 m/s).

6.2

Path and Velocity Errors of Autonomous Driving
The high-level controller was tested on the 2013 Ford Focus EV. A recorded data set

of the vehicle being driven around the track was used as a virtual target for the differential flatness algorithms discussed in Chapter 4. The path error was calculated using the
euclidean distance from the vehicle to the closest point on the desired path and is given by

der

q
= (pn − pnt )2 + (pe − pet )2 .

(6.1)

A single lap autonomous test was performed with the high- and low-level controllers,
and the data was recorded. The trajectory is shown in Fig. 6.3, and the velocity plot is
shown in Fig. 6.4. The path and velocity error plots are shown in Fig. 6.5, where the
average path error was 0.43 meters. However, if the vehicle was permitted to immediately
perform a second lap of automated driving, the average path error for the second lap was
0.28 meters, boasting a 34.9% improvement over the first lap.

Steering Wheel Angle from CAN Bus
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Fig. 6.1: Steering angle step response without deadband compensation.
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Fig. 6.4: Desired and actual velocity of autonomous vehicle.
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Fig. 6.5: Top: Velocity error of autonomous vehicle. Bottom: Path error of autonomous
vehicle, as calculated by euclidean distance.

52

CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION

7.1

Conclusion
The platform discussed in this thesis provides an inexpensive open-source vehicle au-

tomation system that takes advantage of the vehicle’s native communication and control
systems to achieve vehicle control. This method was preferred to more expensive and more
intrusive platforms on the market today. The overall cost of the components needed to
automate a stock vehicle was $2,315, the itemized cost breakdown can be seen in Table
7.1. The hardware described in Chapter 5 is available online, and the code used for automated vehicle testing is available at https://github.com/rajnikant1010/EVAutomation.
This platform will provide a good starting point for automated vehicle research.
The future work opportunities for this project vary in scope and field. First, a more
detailed higher-order model could obtained through a variety of techniques that may better
represent the vehicle. An improved model will improve simulations and aid in the controller
design process. Second, more advanced techniques could be applied to the low-level controllers. The PID approach presented in this thesis is an effective method and is simple to
implement, but other methods could be explored to identify the best approaches. Third,
differential flatness path following controller could be replaced by a variety of path planning

Table 7.1: Itemized Cost Breakdown of Automation Platform
Cost
Component
Swiftnav Piksi RTK-GPS
$995
PCAN - CAN Bus Analyzer $225
TI Tiva C TM4C1294
$20
NewMar UPS
$495
$80
PCB and Components
Computer
$500
TOTAL
$2,315
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controllers to test the effect different controllers have on lateral path accuracy.
The future work planned for this vehicle is dynamic wireless power transfer for inmotion wireless charging. A group of researchers at Utah State University plan to install a
charging coil under the car for wireless charging. In order to have efficient wireless power
transfer, the lateral path accuracy must be less than ± 7 cm. To achieve this, a computer
vision based lane detection and lane keeping algorithm will be developed and tested on the
test track at the EVR.
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